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JUDICIAL LAW REFORM
IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
JOOST BLOM Q.C.t*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Of all the areas of law still dominated by common law principles, the
law of contract has probably changed the least in the last quarter
century or so. This is not for lack of trying on the part of law professors and law reformers. Legal academics have variously asserted that
contract as a distinct branch of the law is dead,' or at least in need
of lifesaving radical surgery. The English Law Commission, together
with the Scottish, tried for years to codify the law of contract and
gave up.2 The Law Reform Commission of Ontario has just produced a long shopping list of reforms, many of which echo changes
that academics have been urging for years.' Yet the law of contract
in 1988, not only in its main features but also in many of its details,
would have seemed quite familiar to someone like Sir Frederick
Pollock, who wrote the first treatise on the law of contract in I876.'
The same could not be said, by any stretch of the imagination, of torts
and restitution.
For all its stability the law of contract has seen a good deal of
reform, most of it judge-made, in the last quarter century or so. In
t Professor, of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
*
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1 G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974).
2 Anson's Law of Contract, 26th ed. by A. G. Guest (1984) at 16-7.
3 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Amendment of the Law of
Contract (r987) (Chair: J. R. Breithaupt). [cited hereafter as OLRC Con-

tracts Report].
4 F. Pollock, Principlesof Contract at Law and in Equity (0876).
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this paper I will try to sketch at least some of the main features of this
judicial law reform in the law of contracts, to suggest the areas where
this reform has been a success and where it has been less so, and, at
the end, to ask what this overall picture tells us about the process of
judicial law reform in the common law.
Successful judicial law reform has, I would submit, two aspects. It
must be internally successful in the sense that the new law integrates
well, conceptually, with the old. It must also be externally successful,
by which I mean that the new law should not have major adverse
effects on the use of contracts as a device for ordering private rights.
These adverse effects can be looked at either at the "micro" level
(they make it more difficult for the parties to make a contract that
does what they want it to do) or at the "macro" level (they inhibit
the role that private ordering can play in the efficient operation of
economic processes).
This view of what is successful is obviously loaded with assumptions. It does assume that freedom of contract is in general, though
with necessary exceptions, a good thing. It also assumes that one
should try to maintain the conceptual integrity of the law of contract.
It is often argued that it is exactly the unwillingness to break out of
traditional modes of thinking about contract that has been the biggest
obstacle to needed reform. Insisting on conceptual integrity, on this
view, just perpetuates the hold of the dead past. Still, I would argue
that real and lasting change in the common law is possible only if the
law continues to make sense to us as a whole, each part of which
stands in a rationally justifiable relation to every other part. This
does not exclude radical, fundamental change, but it does mean that
such change can happen only from the centre outwards, by recasting
the ideas at the core of the law. This has visibly happened to the law
of negligence in the last sixty years or so. One of the many fascinating
comparisons between contract and tort is to ask whether any equivalent revolution at the centre is happening, or can happen, in contract.
This paper will touch on a number of areas of contract in the order
in which they would come up in a conventional first year contracts
course. For the sake of colour, but certainly not scientific precision,
I have assigned each of them a letter, A, B, C or N, based on the
degree of success that judicial law reform has had in that area. If the
reform is successful, albeit sometimes modest in scope, I gave it an
A. The letter B suggests that the reform has succeeded on the whole
but has been accompanied by problems; and C suggests that the
reform has not been successful. An N suggests that there has been
no significant reform where it is often urged that there should be.
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II.

AREAS OF REAL OR POTENTIAL JUDICIAL LAW
REFORM

A.

THE CONCEPT OF AGREEMENT

The common law has been and is wedded to the idea that a contract is by definition a bargain expressed in, or at least reducible to,
a fixed set of terms. These terms are thought of as verbal formulae
that once agreed to become themselves the source from which the
parties' rights and obligations are deduced. It is not what the parties
actually intended, either individually or in common, that is the
contract; it is what the parties agreed to, meaning the terms on which
they agreed, seen as quite detached from their actual intentions. From
this fundamental concept flow most of the important features of the
common law of contract - the making of a contract is almost always
analyzed by finding an offer and an acceptance; the meaning of a
contract is fixed at its inception, barring a new agreement; the parties'
rights under a contract are unaffected by all but the most drastic
changes in circumstances, because the terms survive; an incomplete
or insufficiently clear set of terms cannot be a contract. Still, the law
of contract formation has by no means been static.
(i)

Offer and Acceptance (N)

The very concept of offer and acceptance implies a particular way
of viewing the nature of a contract. It is something that comes into
existence neither over time nor by hindsight, but by words or conduct that clearly signal the making of an agreement at a specific point
in time. This is what Lord Wilberforce aptly called "a rather technical and schematic doctrine of contract", though he admitted that
the facts did not always fit neatly into the scheme.5 For a short while
Lord Denning tried to insinuate a more flexible doctrine of contract
formation based on whether the dealings between the parties, looked
at as a whole, were sufficient evidence of an agreement for a court
safely to hold the parties bound.' But the House of Lords stressed the
merits of certainty and precision in the classical view of offer and
acceptance and firmly repudiated the heresy.' Even a contract proG New Zealand Shipping Co. v. A. M. Satterthwaite& Co. 11975] A.C. 154 at
167 (P.C.).
0 Gibson v. Manchester City Council [1978] 1 W.L.R. 520, [1978] 2 All E.R.

583 (C.A.).

7

Gibson v. Manchester City Council ['9791 1 W.L.R. 294, [1979] x All E.R.
972.
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duced by a "battle of forms", an exchange of mutually contradictory
sets of standard terms, is generally still analyzed as the classic tennis
game of offer, counter-offer and so on, to acceptance.'
Some scholars, most notably in Canada Professors John Swan and
Barry Reiter,9 have argued that the courts should break free from the
tyranny of seeing a contract as a set of terms fixed once and for all
from the time the contract was entered into. This model, it is argued,
prevents the courts from asking directly what, under the circumstances as they exist from time to time, each party is reasonably entitled to expect from the other. This is an inquiry for which a much
more open-textured approach is needed, taking into account the
history of the relations between the parties both before and after the
contract is made, not concentrating all attention on the offer and
acceptance. I think the central concept of what an agreement is has
not changed very much, but the paralyzing hold that this concept has
had on many aspects of the law of contract is slowly but surely being
loosened.
(ii)

Uncertainty of Terms and Agreements to Agree (A)

One of the areas where the law has been made noticeably more
flexible is the problem of incompleteness, where either the parties
spelled out the terms of their agreement vaguely or ambiguously, or
they intended to leave all or some vital parts of the contract for further
negotiation. The British Columbia Court of Appeal offers a good
illustration of this shift. One need only compare First City Investments Ltd. v. FraserArms Hotel Ltd.." which held that the parties
had made a valid contract although they left it to be filled in by
8 Butler Machine Tool Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 401,

[979]

i All E.R. 965 (C.A.). Cf. Tywood Industries Ltd. v. St. Anne-Nackawic
Pulp & Paper Co. (1979) ioo D.L.R. (3d) 374 (Ont. H.C.). See also:
M. G. Shanker, "'Battle of the Forms': A Comparison and Critique of
Canadian, American and Historical Common Law Perspectives" (0979-80)
4 Can. Bus. L.J. 263; D. Vaver, "'Battle of the Forms': A Comment on
Professor Shanker's Views", ibid. at 277.
9 See, e.g.: B. Reiter & J. Swan, "Contracts and the Protection of Reasonable
Expectations", and B. J. Reiter, "Contracts, Torts, Relations and Reliance"
in B. J. Reiter & J. Swan, Studies in Contract Law (198o), i and 239 resp.;
J. Swan, "Whither Contracts: A Retrospective and Prospective Overview"
in Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 1984, Law in Transition:
Contracts (1984), 125; J. Swan, "Contract Law: An Overview of the New
Era" in ContractLaw: A New Era (1987), Tab I, at s.
10 (1979) 104 D.L.R. (3d) 617 (B.C.C.A.). See also: Canada Square Corp.
v. Versafood Services Ltd. (g8i) 13o D.L.R. (3d) 205 (Ont. C.A.); AltaWest Group Investments Ltd. v. Femco Financial Corp. (x984) 34 Alta.

L.R. (2d) 5 (Q.B.).
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"such other covenants as the solicitors for the lender may reasonably
require", with Arnold Nemetz Engineering Ltd. v. Tobien,1 decided only eight years earlier, where the omissions held to be fatal
included the failure to state expressly that a rate of interest specified
in the contract was interest per annum. The most striking recent
example of this increased flexibility is Wiebe v. Bobsien,'2 in which
the vendor argued that a contract for the sale of land was void because it was made subject to a condition precedent that was too
uncertain. The condition was a subject to clause relating to the sale
of the purchaser's old house, without anything being specified as
to the terms on which he would sell. The majority of the Court
(Seaton and Carrothers JJ.A.) said that the law implied an obligation on the purchaser to act in good faith and use all reasonable
efforts to sell his old house, and that these obligations were sufficiently
certain to make the condition precedent legally operative. Lambert
J.A., dissenting, thought that the clause could not be given enough
meaning, because in a dispute about whether the condition precedent
could have been satisfied the Court would have to decide the price
the purchaser should accept for his old house, something he thought
the Court could not reasonably do. The majority were prepared
to hang their conclusion on general standards like "reasonable
efforts" and "good faith" for the sake of enabling parties, who are
usually not lawyers, to use conditions like this without the risk that
it might cause their agreement to unravel.
It is still the received view that an agreement to negotiate is devoid
of legal content. This is based on the idea that if negotiations break
down or never take place, the law cannot substitute a judge's or
arbitrator's view of what the parties ought to have agreed to for the
parties' own agreement. Even this orthodoxy has received a glancing
blow in another recent British Columbia Court of Appeal decision,
Fraserv. Van Nus." The purchaser agreed to buy a large house on
condition that the vendor make very extensive and elaborately described alterations to it. The agreement provided that if the parties
could not agree on the architect's plans by a certain date the contract
would "cease and determine". The Court held that this did not leave
the purchaser free to walk away from the negotiations on the archi-

tect's plans, as he did. Only a genuine failure to agree would cause
11 [1971] 4 W.W.R. 373 (B.G.C.A.).
12 (985)

2o D.L.R. (4th) 475 (B.C.C.A.),

S.C.R. v.
13 (r985) 22 D.L.R. (4th) 459.

leave to appeal refused, [1985]

2
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the contract to determine. Since the purchaser had broken off negotiations for reasons irrelevant to the merits of the architect's plans he
was in breach of contract.' 4 This is a small but significant step in the
direction of imposing legal sanctions for breach of an agreement to
negotiate. 5
Another development, tangential to this point but possibly farreaching, is the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision that negotiating
for a contract may place the parties under obligations to each other
although, without bad faith on either party's side, the negotiations
prove abortive. The parties, held the Court, may nevertheless assume
fiduciary obligations to each other in respect of any confidential information they exchange in the course of negotiations.' The Court did,
however, rest its conclusion specifically on evidence that in the mining industry those who were seriously negotiating towards a joint
venture were regarded as under an obligation not to do anything
detrimental to the other party.' It is hard to say whether (if it
stands) the case will be limited to a narrow range of situations, or
whether it will open the way to apply standards of commercial morality (a phrase invoked by Lambert J.A. in another context' 8 ) to
parties negotiating in other commercial or non-commercial contexts.
(iii) Identification and Interpretation of Terms: The Parol
Evidence Rule (N or A)
The cases on uncertainty and agreements to agree show the courts'
greater willingness to flesh out the bare verbal bones of the parties'
agreement, by implying additional obligations that in the courts'
view are needed to make the contract work as the parties intended it
to, or ought to have intended it to. A related problem is how far the
law should go in using the parties' informal expressions of intention
The Court awarded damages for the full loss of the purchaser's bargain, which
assumed that the parties would have reached agreement if the purchaser had
negotiated in good faith.
15 The Court distinguished the cases on agreements to agree by construing the
contract as, rather, an agreement intended to be binding from the outset subject to a condition subsequent that if the parties after a bona fide attempt were
unable to agree, the contract would be determined (supra, note 13 at 466).
If such a condition subsequent has legal effect, it is hard to see why the same
effect cannot be given to a condition precedent that the parties make a
bona fide attempt to agree.
16 InternationalCorona Resources Ltd. v. LAC Minerals Ltd. (1987) 23 O.A.C.
263, leave to appeal granted, [1987] 2 S.C.R. viii.
'4

17 Ibid. at 301-5.
18 See infra, note 57 and accompanying text.
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to determine what the obligations under the contract are. The most
litigated aspect of this problem is the parol evidence rule. The Supreme Court of Canada has twice in recent years reiterated the rule
in its dogmatic form: if the parties' agreement is in writing, no evidence of promises made during negotiation or at the time of execution
is admissible to vary or contradict the written terms. 9
As academics never tire of pointing out, this rule is not properly
seen as a rule of evidence at all, but a rule of construction; and as a
rule of construction it cannot be an absolute rule of exclusion. The
British Columbia Court of Appeal, through Lambert J.A., has now
said emphatically, twice, that the Supreme Court's version of the
parol evidence rule, when read in the context of the cases' facts, is
no more than a conclusion of how the contracts in those cases ought
to have been construed.2" The rule does not prevent a court in
different factual circumstances from finding that the parties intended
the oral promises to override inconsistent written terms, particularly
where the written terms are not individually negotiated and drafted
but are boiler-plate clauses in standard forms. The Court of Appeal
accordingly deprived a seller of buckwheat seed of the protection of a
clause that said it would "not in any way be responsible for the crop".
The seller had made oral representations in discussions with the buyers that the crop would choke any weeds, whereas the reverse happened."' Similarly, a bank was held bound by its promises, made in
correspondence with the guarantors, that it would monitor the debtor
company's financial position in various ways. The guarantors were
released from liability by the bank's breach of its undertaking, despite
the printed guarantee form's exclusion of all representations other
than those on the form.
This reform, assuming the Court of Appeal's view prevails as it
ought to, is an internal success because it relegates the parol evidence
rule to its proper place in the law, as an expression of a common
sense rule of construction. It may be said to cause external problems
if it makes for greater uncertainty as to whether written terms will
stand up; but the parol evidence rule was subject to so many exceptions even in its old quasi-rigid formulation that it probably never
offered all that much security in the first place.
19 Hawrish v. Bank of Montreal [1969] S.C.R. 515; Bauer v. Bank of Montreal
[198o] 2 S.C.R. o2.

20 Gallen v. Allstate Grain Co. (1984) 9 D.L.R. (4 th) 496 (B.C.C.A.); Toronto
Dominion Bank v. Grifiths (1987) i8 B.C.L.R. (2d) 117 (C.A.).
21

Gallen, ibid.
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CONSIDERATION (N)

Few topics in contracts generate as much academic heat as the
doctrine of consideration. It is regularly denounced as irrational, arbitrary and anachronistic. Yet in the courts it stubbornly lives on, with
only a few signs here and there that judges take it less seriously now
than they did a century ago.
Actually the supposed centrality of the doctrine of consideration in
the law of contract is deceptive. In the vast majority of cases consideration is never an issue. It raises its head, ugly or otherwise, in
only a few limited areas, each of which has distinct policy problems
that the doctrine of consideration, albeit haphazardly, does answer
to some extent. In practical terms the doctrine operates as a rule that
invalidates five rather narrow categories of promises.
First, it says that promises to make a gift are not binding. There
is no strong sentiment in any quarter to change this rule. 2 Secondly,
the doctrine of consideration dictates the invalidity of a promise to
pay for a benefit already received. This "past consideration" rule is
already subject to a judge-made exception that if the benefit was
rendered at the promisor's request, a subsequent promise to pay for
the benefit will be binding. The Ontario Law Reform Commission
recommends legislative reform so that a promise based on past consideration will be enforceable to the extent necessary to prevent the
promisor from being unjustly enriched, which effectively means if
the benefit was conferred other than as a gift or gratuitous service. 3
It is not clear to me that the proposed statutory rule would significantly alter the position already reached at common law or that the
past consideration rule causes any real difficulty. The Commission
cites only one case where the rule barred the enforcement of a promise that it thinks probably should have been enforced: Eastwood v.
Kenyon in i840-

The third and fourth situations in which the doctrine of consideration strikes down promises are those of the variation of a contract.
A promise to pay or do more in exchange for getting something one
is already legally entitled to get from the other party is not binding.
Conversely, a promise to accept less from the other party than one
is legally entitled to get is also not binding. Here doctrine does fly in
the face of common sense. Lawyers may think of contracts as an
22

23
24

OLRC ContractsReport at 8.
Ibid. at 18-2o.
(1840) 113 E.R. 482. The modem extent of the rule is given in Pao On v.
Lau Yiu Long [x98o] A.G. 614, [1979] 3 All E.R. 65 (P.C.).
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array of terms that, once fixed, cannot be changed except by a new,
independently valid contract, but ordinary rational people do not. A
contract is a blueprint for achieving a particular result, and when
the parties agree to change the blueprint because they think the
result will then be more satisfactory, it would not occur to them to
ask whether the change benefits only one side (in which case the law
says the change is not binding), or involves at least some benefit on
both sides (in which case it is binding). Lord Blackburn pointed out
the unreality of this distinction more than a hundred years ago."
He thought that in fact an agreement to vary a contract was always
supported by consideration, because whoever was agreeing to pay
more or accept less got, at the very least, the benefit that the other side
was more likely to stick to the new arrangement than to the old.
Nevertheless the law has clung to the almost metaphysical notion that
a promise to do what you are already bound by contrac2 6 to do, is
not consideration.
Recent cases in Canadian courts on promises to pay or do more in
exchange for what the other party was already bound to do have
produced nothing but a repetition of orthodox principle and a rejection of the claim based on the promise. 7 The result still has the
slight attraction that it may be thought to deter one party from pressing the other to "up the ante" or otherwise risk a breach of contract.
This deterrent effect is extremely doubtful, since the rule can be
circumvented so easily (by making the promise under seal or for
nominal consideration), and the sanction comes only in the relatively rare case where the "victim" fails to pay up and the "extorting"
party takes him to court. If extortion is a problem, surely a doctrine
of unconscionable pressure would do a better job than consideration.
The consideration rule inhibits sensible adjustments to contracts as
conditions change. It occasionally lets a judge deal with a promise
he or she thinks the promisor should not have made, like the waiver
of liability signed by the plaintiff in Delaney v. Cascade River Holidays Ltd.2 81
Often it is possible to enforce the promise in the converse situation,
where one party agrees to accept less from the other. In some circum25 Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605 at 622.
26 That is, a contract with the promisee; a promise to perform an existing contractual obligation to a third party is good consideration.
27 Gilbert Steel Ltd. v. University Const. Ltd. (1976)
67 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 6o6
(Ont. C.A.); Abraham v. Wingate Properties Ltd. [1986] 1 W.W.R. 568,
reconsidered on other points, [1986] 2 W.W.R. 568 (Man. C.A.).

28 (983)

44 B.C.L.R. 24 at 33-5 per Nemetz C.J.B.C. (dissenting).
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stances the provision in the Law and Equity Act about part performance of an obligation 29 makes the promise binding. In many
other cases the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel applies; the

promisor is precluded from insisting on his or her full contractual
rights where it would be unconscionable to do so. The doctrine of
consideration nevertheless demands that the promise be used only as
a shield - only to provide a defence to the other party when the
first party makes a claim (or sets up a defence)" based on the
original contract terms. The promise cannot be used by the other
party as a new cause of action in itself, as a promise as fully binding
as if it had been supported by consideration. 1 Judges, particularly in
Canada, see little merit in this distinction now, and have almost
reached the point of breaking it down completely. 2 A Saskatchewan
judge recently said that the distinction was gone.33 We are moving
inexorably closer to the famous s. 90 of the Second Restatement on
Contracts, 4 the American concept of promissory estoppel affording
a cause of action based on reliance. This of course applies much more
widely than just in the area of modifying contracts. Section 90 was
recently cited in a decision of the Federal Court, in which officials
on behalf of the federal Crown had persuaded a native Indian to
move off his reserve, where he had become unpopular because he
operated an extensive tree farm business. The Court enforced the
Crown's promise, given in very general terms, to see that he was
compensated. 5
The Ontario Law Reform Commission's proposals in this area are
twofold: first, that any agreement in good faith modifying a contract
should not require consideration to be binding; 6 and, second, that
29

R.S.B.O.

1979,

c. 224, s. 40.

30 Robertson v. Minister of Pensions [1949] 1 K.B. 227

(K.B.D.); Charles
Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenhaim [195o] z K.B. 616 (C.A.); cf. Conwest Exploration Co. v. Letain [1964] S.C.R. 20.
31 Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 K.B. 215 (O.A.); Gilbert Steel Ltd. v. University
Const. Ltd., supra, note 27.
32 Re Tudale ExplorationsLtd. and Bruce (978)
88 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 584 (Ont.
Div. Ct.); Petridis v. Shabinsky (1982) 132 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 430 (Ont. H.C.).
See also: Rusonik v. Canada Trust Co. (1986) 39 R.P.R. 263 (Ont. H.O.);
Watson v. Canada Permanent Trust Co. (0972) 27 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 735
(B.C.S.C.), rev'd on other grounds (1974) 66 D.L.R. (3d) 85 (a.A.).
33 Royal Bank of Canada v. Forster (x986) 47 Sask. R. 209 at 21!2-3 (Q.B.)
per McLellan J.
34 American Law Institute, Restatement of Law, Second: Contracts, s. 90.
35 Mentuck v. The Queen [2986] 3 F.C. 249 (T.D.). The decision was based
on a unilateral contract, but promissory estoppel and s. 9o were brought in to
buttress the importance of the plaintiff's reliance on the Crown's promise.
36 OLRC Contracts Report at 13-8.
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the American concept of promissory estoppel, the enforcement of
promises based on reliance, be adopted in Ontario."
The fifth type of situation where the doctrine of consideration
strikes down a promise is the gratuitous option, a promise to keep an
offer open for a certain time without the offeree's supplying anything
in return for that promise. An option is a powerful right, because it
gives the person who has it the unfettered choice to do nothing or
to claim the benefit of the contract in full, whereas the person who
gives the option is committed for its duration. There is some merit in
requiring a degree of deliberateness on the part of the promisor as a
condition for enforcing an option, and the presence of consideration
(though it may be nominal3") performed that role, though not particularly well. The Ontario Law Reform Commission would change
the rule about firm offers only for offers made in the course of a
business, on the theory that business people at least are likely to know
what they are doing when they make a promise to keep the offer
open.' "
C.

WAIVERS OF CoNDITIONS PRECEDENT (C)

This is my only C. It is really an example of unintended judicial
law reform. The Supreme Court of Canada, announcing the rule in
Turney v. Zhilka,4' seemed to think that it was established law. If a
contract is made subject to a "true" condition precedent, whose fulfilment depends on the will of a third party, and that condition precedent is not fulfilled, the Supreme Court's rule is that even if the
condition was inserted for the exclusive benefit of one party, that
party has no right to waive the nonfulfilment of the condition and
enforce the contract. In fact no other common law jurisdiction takes
this view, and the British Columbia Law Reform Commission
pointed out"' that it is based on a confusion between a condition
precedent to the existence of any contract at all (where it is true to
say that neither party has any rights before the condition is fulfilled)
and a condition precedent to the performance of the obligations
under a contract (where the parties are under obligations to each
other before the condition precedent is fulfilled, if only to wait until
37 Ibid. at 25-32.
38 As in Mountford v. Scott [,9751 Oh. 258 (C.A.).
30 OLRC ContractsReport at 2o-5.
40 ['959] S.C.R. 578.
41 Law Reform Commission of B.C., Report on Waiver of Conditions Precedent

in Contracts (1977)

(Chair: L. Getz), esp. at io-z.
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the condition is either fulfilled or not and to do nothing to interfere
42 the Supreme Court
with its fulfilment). In Barnett v. Harrison,
adhered to its position. Despite counsel's frontal assault on the rule,
the Court thought that letting one party waive the nonfulfilment of a
true condition precedent was like having one's cake and eating it too.
If the condition is fulfilled one gets the benefit of the contract; if it
isn't, one can still get the contract or can get out scot-free. The British
Columbia Law Reform Commission found this reasoning unpersuasive, as indeed it is, and recommended the enactment of what
became s. 49 of the Law and Equity Act 3 This abolishes the "true
condition precedent" rule and treats waiver of a condition precedent
like waiver of any other provision that is exclusively for one's own
benefit.
Here, I suggest that judicial law reform was unsuccessful because
the legal concepts were allowed to drift loose from their moorings.
The Supreme Court was impressed by the "different" nature of a
condition precedent, and deduced that the right to waive such a
condition must therefore be different from the right to waive other
provisions of a contract." Conditions precedent, for this particular
purpose, are in fact not materially different from other provisions
of the contract, as the British Columbia legislature has now said.

D.

MISREPRESENTATION (A/B)

This, and the doctrine of privity, are two areas where the tort of
negligence has been used to overcome the felt shortcomings of traditional contract doctrine. The result here was the more successful of
the two. According to classical contract law, if a person is induced to
enter into a disadvantageous contract by misrepresentations of fact
by the other party, and it is no longer possible to rescind the contract,
the injured party has a remedy in damages only if the representation
was fraudulent, or if the representation could be regarded as a term
of the bargain or at least a contract collateral to the main bargain.45
If it is not a contractual promise and not fraudulent, there is no remedy once the right to rescission is gone. However, once Hedley Byrne
& Co. v. Heller & PartnersLtd 46 established that a negligent mis42 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 531.
48 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 224.

4 Barnett v. Harrison,supra, note 42 at 558 per Dickson J.
14 App. Gas. 337 (H.L.); Heilbut, Symons & Co. v.
Buckleton [19z3] A.C. 3o (H.L.).

45 Derry v. Peek (z889)
46

[964] A.C. 465 (H.L.).
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statement causing financial loss could give a cause of action in tort to
the person who reasonably relied on it, it was only a matter of time
before this right of action was fully integrated with the law of contract.
The integration was accomplished in England with Esso Petroleum
Co. v. Mardon4 7 in 1976. Canadian courts quickly accepted that a
negligent misrepresentation inducing a contract gave a right to damages, although it was not until last year that Hedley Byrne was declared by the Supreme Court of Canada to be fully applicable to
negligent information or advice given in the course of a contractual
relationship.
The right of action in negligence established in Hedley Byrne has
generally dovetailed well with the law of contract because the criteria for the duty of care in tort, summarized as the need for a "special
relationship" between advisor or informant and the plaintiff, are
harmonious with and to some extent inspired by the law of contract.49
Now and then the internal dynamic of the law of negligence, which
focuses on the defendant's fault and therefore sees the plaintiff as a
victim, has pushed recovery beyond what these criteria would seem to
justify if they are applied with an eye to the contractual setting of the
case. A good example, I think, is the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in V. K. Mason ConstructionLtd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia." This
held at one and the same time that a letter of comfort to a contractor
from the bank that was providing financing to the developer was not
reasonably to be construed as a promise that the contractor would be
paid, but was an assurance that the financing was adequate to cover
the full project. It was reasonable for the contractor to rely on this
assurance, and the contractor could therefore sue the bank in tort
when it did not get paid because the developer did not have enough
funds. I would suggest that a reasonable contractor, seeing that the
bank's letter was not a guarantee of payment, would have either
taken steps to get further assurances or gone ahead fully realizing that
it was taking a risk. In the latter case, recovery in tort is unjustified.
In this kind of case the function of tort recovery is so close to that
of recovery on a contractual promise that to let the result depend on
the form of the action is something that requires strong justification.
'1 [1976] Q.B. 8o, [1976] 2 All E.R. 5 (C.A.).
48 Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse [x986] 2 S.C.R. 147, overruling implicitly on this
point 1. Nunes Diamonds Ltd. v. Dominion Electric Protection Co. [I972]
S.C.R. 769.
49 See especially Lord Devlin in Hedley Byrne, supra, note 46 at 526-9.
10 [985] i S.O.R. 271, (985)
16 D.L.R. (4th) 598.
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That justification was not present in the Mason case, which I would
suggest is another example of a legal concept, that of a duty of care in
giving information or advice, being carried by its own momentum
into cases where, seen in a broader context, it does not belong.
E.

UNCONSCIONABILITY (A)

Canadian courts have been leaders in developing the theory that
an unfair contract procured through the use of a stronger bargaining
position should not be allowed to stand. Davey C.J.B.C. first stated
this equitable doctrine in its modem form51 in 1965.52 His decision
was one of those relied on by Lord Denning when he too adopted a
theory of inequality of bargaining power in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v.
Bundy 3 ten years later. In England the House of Lords has recently
doubted the correctness of Lord Denning's view and suggested that
judges have no business putting new restrictions on freedom of contract in the name of redressing inequality of bargaining position; that,
the Law Lords thought, should be left to Parliament."
In Canada, however, judges have felt no such inhibitions.55 In
Harry v. Kreutziger5 the British Columbia Court of Appeal reaffirmed the doctrine of the unconscionable use of bargaining power.
Lambert J.A., in a separate judgment, sought to put the doctrine on
a more general basis than a quasi-mechanical weighing up of the
degree of inequality between the parties, and the extent to which
the terms of the contract were unfair. He suggested the true question
was "whether the transaction, seen as a whole, is sufficiently divergent
from community standards of commercial morality that it should be
rescinded"." The doctrine has spread well beyond the type of case in
51 The older doctrine was restricted to a few stereotyped cases, such as catching
52

bargains with expectant heirs.
Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd. (1965) 55 D.L.R. (2d) 710 (B.C.C.A.).

[1975] Q.B. 326, ['974] 3 All E.R. 757 (C.A.).
-4 National Westminster Bank v. Morgan [1985] A.C. 686 at 708, [1985] x All
E.R. 82 1 at 83o.
55 A factor may be that legislatures in Canada have generally done less to deal
with abuse of contractual bargaining power, for example in standard form
53

contracts, than in England. Lord Scarman in National Westminster Bank
v. Morgan, ibid., gave Parliament's legislative activity as a primary reason why
judges should exercise restraint.

56 (i978) 95 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 23!. See also Buchanan v. CanadianImperial Bank
of Commerce (198o) 125 D.L.R. (3d) 394 (B.C.C.A.). Cf. Lott v. Angelucci (1982) 36 B.C.L.R. 273 (B.C.C.A.); Bomek v. Bomek (1983) 546
57

D.L.R. (3d) 139 (Man. C.A.).
Ibid. at 241.
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which a person disadvantaged by age, infirmity or lack of education
is exploited by someone else. The Ontario Court of Appeal, for example, recently held that a bank was under a duty to ensure that a
woman, from whom they proposed taking a mortgage to secure her
son's debt to the bank, had independent legal advice.5" The duty
was expressly not based on any fiduciary 'relationship between her
and the bank; 9 she did not look to the bank for advice on the merits
of the transaction. The duty was said to arise from the nature of what
the bank was asking her to do and what the bank stood to gain from
it, as well as her age (seventy-one), low education and poor English.
The decision may therefore have quite broad implications for the
way in which banks conduct these transactions.
The concept of unconscionability has two components, which are
often called procedural unconscionability (the way the plaintiff is
induced to enter into the contract is unfair) and substantive unconscionability (the bargain is in itself unfair because the plaintiff gets a
bad deal). Beyond a few hints in obiter dicta 0 the courts have not yet
held that a contract, or a provision in a contract, can be held invalid
or set aside simply because its terms work unduly harshly on one
party. The traditional view is that so long as the playing field is not
tilted too much (i.e. there is no procedural unconscionability, incapacity or duress) everybody should be free to drive as hard a bargain as he or she can. But the means by which the bargain is brought
about are scrutinized much more strictly than they used to be. Canadian courts have held, for example, that a clause in an employment
contract providing for termination on short notice is unconscionable
if it was part of a contract that the employee was asked to sign on a
"take it or leave it" basis.61
58 Bertolo v. Bank of Montreal (x986) 33 D.L.R. (4th) 61o.
59 I have not dealt with the judiciary's increasing enthusiasm for the fiduciary
relationship as a means of expanding a party's obligations beyond those that
the contractual relationship might otherwise include. This is linked to contract law but goes well beyond it in many respects. Its primary function is not
to give relief from the contract but to give damages for losses arising elsewhere,
as from a transaction the advisee enters into with a third party. Sometimes
the fiduciary duty is invoked to amplify the obligations under a contract for
professional services; see for example Kuruyo Trading Ltd. v. Acme Garment
Co. (r975) Ltd. [1988] 3 W.W.R. 644 (Man. Q.B.).
0 Most notably in Hillis Oil & Sales Ltd. v. Wynn's Canada Ltd. [5986] 1
S.C.R. 57 at 67 per Le Dain J.
"1 Dolden v. Clarke Simpkins Ltd. (1983) 3 C.C.E.L. 153 (B.C.S.C.); Clark
v. Optyl (Canada) Ltd. (1985) 61 N.B.R. (2d) 377, x58 A.P.R. 377 (C.A.).
Cf. Wallace v. Toronto Dominion Bank (1983) 145 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 431 (Ont.

C.A.).
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I have suggested that this aspect of judicial law reform in contracts
is a success because it does no violence to the structure of the law. The
notion of agreement, by definition, must involve scope for examining
the nature of the parties' consent to the terms. It is also a reform
couched in terms of justice between the parties based on their individual circumstances, so it does not open up a very broad range of
contracts to uncertainty and litigation.
The same might not be true of the Ontario Law Reform Commission's suggestion that the terms of every contract should, by legislation, be made subject to judicial review on the ground of unconscionability. The review is to take into account all the circumstances
of the case including as a minimum twelve listed factors which cover
both procedural and substantive aspects of the contract.0 2 In addition the Commission would imply into every contract an obligation
to perform it in good faith notwithstanding any terms that might
limit that obligation.63 "Good faith" is left undefined for this purpose.
I wonder about the advisability of giving judges the discretion to
declare a contract not binding, or a party to be in breach of contract,
on the basis of an abstract and many-sided principle like "unconscionability" or "good faith", detached from any particular factual
context. The merit of developing such concepts by judicial decision,
case by case, is that the principle is usually (though not always) reasonably well trimmed to the need for it. The courts have been adept
at weighing the need to do justice in the particular case before them
with the need to keep the law clear and certain enough to be predictable. Parties who make a contract ought to be reasonably sure that
it will hold up to do the work they want and will not be invalidated
by an unpredictable exercise of a judicial discretion. Parties want to
be able to perform their contract against the background of a reasonably clear idea of what their legal position would be if they or the
other side departed from the contract's terms.
The Commission's argument is that judges have been developing
the "doctrines" of unconscionability and good faith but are inhibited
by traditional concepts from doing it as openly and as extensively as
they should. I am inclined to agree with the first part of this argument0 4 but not the second, which I think underrates both the forth62 OLRC ContractsReport at 128-32.

'6 Ibid. at 165-76.
'4 I would quibble with the assertion that the cases show an evolving "doctrine"
of unconscionability; I think they show several doctrines, applied to different
problems.
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rightness and the ingenuity of the judiciary. It may be worth noting
that the Commission does not provide one concrete case of unconscionability or bad faith where judges have been or may be unable to
do justice with the instruments the common law already puts into
their hands.0

F.

EXEMPTION CLAUSES (B)

This area used to loom large in first year contract courses, but now
that the judge-made (which in this context meant Lord Denningmade) device of fundamental breach, 6 designed specifically to attack
exemption clauses, has been firmly relegated by the House of Lords
to the dustbin of history, 7 the ordinary process of construing a contract should apply (said the Law Lords) to exemption clauses as to
any other clauses of the contract. Exemption clauses had no special
status that would allow a judge to disregard them if, on their true
construction, they applied to limit or exclude the rights that the
injured party would have had without the clause. Of course "true
construction" here means construction contra proferentem if the
clause was inserted by one party for that party's advantage, as it
almost always would be.
In Beaufort Realties (1964) Inc. v. Chomedey Aluminum Co s
the Supreme Court of Canada accepted the letter of the House of
Lords' decision but not fully the spirit. In a completely non-consumer
situation - a mechanics' lien claim by an unpaid subcontractor on a
Court held that a clause in the sublarge building project -the
contract by which the subcontractor waived its lien rights should be
construed not to apply to a situation where the general contractor
committed a fundamental breach of contract by failing to pay the
subcontractor. The decision was based on Wilson J.'s emphasis, in
her judgment in the Ontario Court of Appeal, on whether it was
"fair and reasonable" that the waiver should survive the "disinte05 See the critique by D. Vaver, "Unconscionability: Panacea, Analgesic or
Loose Can(n)on?" (1988) I4 Can. Bus. L.J. 40.
C Actually Lord Denning fashioned a series of devices under that rubric, the
two most influential of which were the "breach of a fundamental obligation"
idea in Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v. Wallis [1956] 1 W.L.R. 936, [1956] 2

All E.R. 866 (G.A.), and the "destruction of the contract" rationale in

Harbutt's Plasticene Ltd. v. Wayne Tank & Pump Co. [1970] 1 Q.B. 447,
[r970] I All E.R. 225 (C.A.).
07 Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [198o] A.C. 827, [1980]
i All E.R. 556.
08 [r98o] 2 S.C.R. 718.
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gration of its contractual setting", and her conclusion that it was not
fair and reasonable because the subcontractor, when it agreed to the
waiver, "had no reason to anticipate that as the work progressed it
would ever be out of pocket in any substantial amount".:"
There is still more than a hint in the Beaufort case of the "rule
of law" approach to exemption clauses - that they must be policed
by the courts, and even if clearly drafted cannot be permitted to
operate beyond a certain extent. The trouble all along has been that
the dividing line between the permissible use and the overreaching
use of exemption clauses is so hard to define. It seems to be a combination of the degree to which the clause was the subject of bargainmng, the relative bargaining strengths of the parties, the severity of
the clause, and the extent to which giving the clause effect would
make the bargain from the plaintiff's point of view a lopsidedly disadvantageous one.
The Ontario Law Reform Commission's recommendation that
judges be given by statute the power to declare any clause in any
contract void for unconscionability, or otherwise give relief from its
consequences, has already been noted. It was obviously directed to
a great extent towards the problem of exemption clauses. The nonexclusive list of a dozen factors that the courts are to consider in
making their evaluations is largely based on the English Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977,"' and, as already mentioned, embraces both
procedural and substantive aspects of the agreement. I repeat my
reservation about enacting a sweeping dispensing power that is subject to no limits as to the kind of contract on which it may be exercised
(unlike the English Act, which applies only to liability for things done
in the course of a business"2 ) and is almost unreviewable because it
is to be exercised on no clearly articulated principle."
The judicial law reform in this area, even accepting the House of
69 Chomedey Aluminum Co. v. Belcourt Construction (Ottawa) Ltd. (979)
97D.L.R. (3d) 17oat 178.
o70
Ibid. at i8o.
71

72

(U.K.) 1977, c. 50, Sch. 2.
Ibid., s. 1(3) ; see also the excepted contracts in Sch. i.

73 See George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd. 1983]
2 A.C. 803 at 815-6, where Lord Bridge said that a decision on whether an
exemption clause met the "fair and reasonable" test in the Unfair Contract
Terms Act r977 should be interfered with on appeal only in exceptional circumstances, because it involved the balancing of such a variety of considerations that the trial judge's view had to be treated with the utmost respect.
This has been described as a kind of "ad hoc dispute settlement in the trial
courts" that "will horrify commercial contractors": J. N. Adams & R. Brownsword, "The Unfair Contract Terms Act: A Decade of Discretion" (1988) 104
L.Q.R. 94 at 1r8.
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Lords' counter-reform, has been very significant. The judiciary's
ability to achieve fairness through the way it approaches the construction of exemption clauses has repeatedly been demonstrated. A
good example, albeit a dissenting view on the facts of the case, is
Nemetz C.J.B.G.'s judgment in Delaney v. Cascade River Holidays
Ltd." The question was whether a "Standard Liability Release"
signed by a passenger at the start of a white water rafting trip was
binding so as to prevent recovery from the rafting operator by the
passenger's estate after the passenger was drowned because, according to the trial judge, the operator had been negligent in providing
lifejackets of inadequate buoyancy."' Nemetz G.J.B.G. focused on the
way in which the ordinary person would read the document, given
the way it was actually presented to the passenger - not weighing its
words like a lawyer, but bringing to it the assumption that anything
so "standard" was unlikely to be as drastic as, literally read, the
release was.
Such a willingness to construe agreements in their whole factual
context, based on how somebody in the plaintiff's position would read
them- here casually, with no eye for verbal nuance, with a set of
everyday attitudes and assumptions - is a technique powerful
enough to deal with most exemption clauses. Even if the technique
is taken so far as to disregard the words of the contract (or some of
them) entirely,"6 I would submit that it can be squared with principle. The objective meaning of a contract is not necessarily the sum
of the objective meanings of its parts. Some express clauses may be
inconsistent with other express clauses and have to be disregarded.
There is no reason why a court cannot say that an express clause is
inconsistent with the overriding impression given by the terms as a
whole, read as they would be by someone in the plaintiff's position.
Admittedly there are obvious dangers in straying too far from the
wording, but requiring the conclusion to be justified in terms of the
agreement's construction gives the law a surer direction, I would
argue, than just making the judge incantate an open-sesame word
like "unconscionable" and list a series of factors that he or she considered. I suspect that there are really very few cases where such a
broad approach to construction cannot do justice. The exception
is where the ordinary person tends not to think of the contract in
Supra,note 28.
The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the negligence had not been
shown to have caused or contributed to the passenger's death.
70 As, in effect, was done in Tilden Rent-a-Car Co. v. Clendenning (1978) 83
D.L.R. ( 3 d) 400 (Ont. C.A.).
74
75
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terms of "terms" at all, but as a generic transaction like buying groceries or getting into a taxi. Consumer sales of goods are often of this
kind. If the ordinary consumer would think of the written terms as
peripheral to the contract, assuming he or she thinks of them at all,
the idea of "construing" the agreement as the ordinary consumer
would "read" it becomes unreal. Here the common law of contract
reaches its limit. When we reach this point, legislative regulation of
the parties' rights, as is already done to some extent in consumer
sales of goods by the British Columbia Sale of Goods Act, 7 seems to
be the only practical alternative.
C.

MISTAKE (B)

The most significant recent judicial law reform in the law of mistake'3 is the outcome of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Ron Engineering& Construction(Eastern) Ltd. v. The Queen1 The
direct effect of that case was actually to reverse a tentative reform
initiated by the Ontario Court of Appeal."0 This was to the effect
that a mistake not as to what the terms of an offer are, but affecting
the offeror's reasons for proposing a fundamental term like the price,
will prevent the other party from accepting the offer if that party
knows about the offeror's mistaken "motive". The effect of Ron
Engineering,and the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of Ron in City
of Calgary v. Northern Construction Co."1 is that a mistake in calculating the contract price, even if it is known to the offeree by the
time the offer is accepted, is no ground for relief if the offer is submitted as part of a competitive tendering process the terms of which
bind the offeror to keep the offer open,"2 and there is nothing about
the offer when it is submitted to indicate the mistake.8 3
77

R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 370, s.

78

The doctrine of equitable mistake in Solle v. Butcher [595o] I K.B. 67,
(C.A.), would fall into the general time frame for this survey but has been
omitted for reasons of space.
[i98i] i S.C.R. Iii.
Belle River Community Arena Inc. v. W. I. C. Kaufmann Co. (0978) 20
O.R. (2d) 447, 87 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 76z.
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 757, affg [1986] 2 W.W.R. 426 (Alta. C.A.).
These terms may be express, as when they are part of the invitation to tenderers, or implied, as when they form part of the custom in the industry: see
Gloge Heating & Plumbing Ltd. v. Northern Construction Co. (1986) 27
D.L.R. ( 4 th) 264 (Alta. C.A.).
It is possible that a court might give relief if the result of holding the offeror
to his offer would be unconscionable: see Kerans J.A. in City of Calgary v.
Northern Construction Co., supra,note 81 at 44x-3 (Alta. C.A.).
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80
81
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Ron Engineering nevertheless deserves to be called a reforming
case because it decided, contrary to established doctrine, 4 that the
mere submission of a tender creates a contractual relationship between the tenderer and the offeree. This was characterized in the
case itself as a unilateral contract, but it is clearly bilateral. The
tenderer typically promises not to withdraw a bid, to enter into a
formal construction contract if called upon to do so, and to forfeit
a deposit or be subject to legal liability if he or she defaults on these
obligations. What the offeree provides as consideration for these
obligations was left rather shadowy in Ron itself85 but can only be
some reciprocal promise, since it is certainly not any act of performance. The true consideration, although no court has put it this
bluntly, is at least that the offeree promises to consider the bid as part
of an orderly and fair competitive tendering process. Cases since Ron
have elaborated on the obligations of the offeree, usually the owner
of the construction project. The owner must deal equally with the
bidders, so that he or she cannot negotiate changes in the specifications with one of them without giving the others a chance to compete
on a different
on equal terms.8 The owner cannot award the contract
87
basis from that indicated to bidders beforehand.
In this side-effect, if not in its direct effect, I suggest that Ron
Engineeringhas improved the law by giving a juristic basis for what
was usually assumed in practice: that the rules of a competitive bidding process were binding on both parties so that the interests of each
were protected. The reason I would sum up this reform as a B rather
than an A is that the conceptual basis for this approach has not been
clearly articulated, with the result that a good deal of litigation has
been, and probably still is, needed to clarify the legal situation.
The Ontario Law Reform Commission's thinking on mistake is
in keeping with its general tendency in this Report to rely on judicial
discretion. If the mistake was or ought to have been known to the
defendant, the court should have a discretion to grant the mistaken
plaintiff such relief as may be just, depending on a variety of cirThe only earlier authority pointing in this direction was Warlow v. Harrison
0859) 2oo E.R. 925 (Exch. Oh.), whose effect has been limited to undertakings to hold an auction without reserve.
85 Estey J. referred to an obligation, subject to some qualifications, to accept the
lowest bid: supra, note 79 at 123.
86 Ben Bruinsma & Sons Ltd. v. City of Chatham (1984) 29 B.L.R. 148, 11
Const. L.R. 37 (Ont. H.C.); Best Cleaners & Contractors Ltd. v. The
Queen [1985] 2 F.C. 293 (C.A.).
87 CanamericanAuto Lease & Rental Ltd. v. Canada [1987] 3 F.C. 144, (1987)
84

37 D.L.R. (4th) 591 (C.A.).
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cumstances including the plaintiff's conduct, the defendant's reliance
on the contract and the plaintiff's fault."8 My own view at the moment is that such a solution may depend too much on the knowledge
of the facts that hindsight always gives a court. An owner who is told
shortly after bids are opened that the lowest tenderer has made a
mistake is in no position to judge whether this is true, let alone to
guess how a court vested with a wide equitable discretion would deal
with the claim. The Commission's argument might be that this very
uncertainty would concentrate the parties' minds on making a fair
settlement. It might, conversely, encourage the owner, at least, to
harden his or her position so as to discourage bidders from making
such claims in the future. This is an area where empirical research
into industry practice might be very useful.
H.

PRVITYOF CONTRACT (N)

Despite unceasing efforts to prove that the doctrine of privity is
historical nonsense 9 it survives almost intact, as the Supreme Court
of Canada once more decided not long ago.90 The only real dent the
judges have made in the doctrine relates to clauses in shipping contracts by which the shipper agrees to an exemption or limitation of
liability not only for the benefit of the carrier, who is the other party
to the contract, but also for the benefit of others, like stevedores, who
are part of the performance of the contract but not parties to it. These
clauses have been held capable of being relied upon by the stevedores,
on the theory that the carrier agreed to the exemption or limitation
clause as the stevedores' agent?' The Supreme Court of Canada
recently expressed its approval of this (rather strained) analysis because it works "by placing the relationship of the parties into the
traditional mold of the law of contract" 2
The doctrine of privity is so firmly entrenched for two reasons.
One is that, like the doctrine of consideration, it is based on a prin259-66. This discretion is excluded where the
contract expressly or impliedly puts the risk of the mistake on the plaintiff, a
proviso of a somewhat circular nature.
89 For the most recent example see R. Flannigan, "Privity - The End of an
88 OLRC Contracts Report at

90

Era (Error)" (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 564.
Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Beattie [598o] 2 S.C.R. 228, (198o) itz
D.L.R. (3d) 257.

In New Zealand Shipping Co. v. A. M. Satterthwaite & Co., supra, note 5,
followed in ITO -International
Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752, (x986) 28 D.L.R. (4 th) 641.
92 ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc.,
ibid. at 787 (S.C.R.), 666 (D.L.R.) per McIntyre J.
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ciple with an almost mathematical absoluteness about it. Where the
conceptual framework of the law is clearest it is hardest to change by
incremental means. The other is that, unlike questions that arise
only in a narrow range of contracts (like unconscionability or even
exemption clauses) or in relatively atypical situations (mistake),
privity is a doctrine whose ramifications cover a huge area, and any
change is correspondingly difficult to assess as to its practical effects.
The Ontario Law Reform Commission rather breezily recommends
that a single statutory section be enacted declaring the doctrine
abolished. 3 This may be the right way to go, but I would feel more
confident about it if the Commission had given at least some discussion of the implications of such a change for different areas of the
law, particularly commercial law.
The major judicial attempt to remedy the doctrine of privity of
contract has come in the law of torts. Cases like JuniorBooks Ltd. v.
Veitchi Co.,." B.D.C. Ltd. v. Hofstrand Farms Ltd.,9 Ross v.
Caunters," and many cases on negligent misstatement are all attempts by third parties to recover damages for the defendant's failure
to perform a contract with someone else. Junior Books adumbrated
an approach to duty of care in negligence that went a fairly long way
towards cancelling out privity of contract, at least in the context of
negligent manufacture. It was precisely because of the totally disruptive effect that such a right of action in tort would have on well
settled contractual arrangements, that the English courts have now
all but cut back JuniorBooks to its facts.98
I.

DAmAGES IN LIEU OF RESCISSION (A)

As a final area, one may note a narrow but particularly successful
piece of judicial law reform by the British Columbia Court of Appeal.
93 OLRC ContractsReport at 49-71, esp. at 7.

94 For example, is a building subcontract a contract "for the benefit of' the
owner so that the latter can sue the subcontractor directly in contract?
05 [1983] 1 A.O. 520, [1982] 3 All E.R. 2o (H.L.).
90 [1986] 1 S.O.R. 228.
07 [I98O] Oh. 297, [i979] 3 All E.R. 58o (Oh. D.).
98 The best examples in contractual settings are: Leigh & Sillavan Ltd. v.
Aliakmon Shipping Co. [1986] A.C. 785, [1986] 2 All E.R. 145 (H.L.);
Simaan General Contracting Co. v. Pilkington Glass Ltd. (No. 2) [1988]
2 W.L.R. 761 (C.A.); Muirhead v. Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd. [1986]
Q.B. 507, [1985] 3 All E.R. 705 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1986] 1
W.L.R. x38o (H.L.); Candlewood Navigation Corp. v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines
Ltd. [1986] A.C. 1, [1985] 2 All E.R. 935 (P.C.). Cf. CanadianPacific Hotels
Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal [1987] 1 S.C.R. 7 I.
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Dusik v. NewtonY9 was a case where the Court held the contract to
be the product of the unconscionable use of superior bargaining
strength. Quite clearly, on the authorities, the only remedy for such a
case is rescission of the contract, which in the circumstances of that
case could not be granted because the status quo ante could not be
restored. Unconscionability is not a breach of contract and not a tort,
so damages cannot be given on those grounds. Lord Cairns' Act' 00
empowers the courts to give damages in lieu of ordering specific
performance or an injunction, but not in lieu of rescission. The Court
of Appeal simply declared that such a technical distinction was now
obsolete. The courts had inherent power to grant damages in lieu of
rescission analogously to specific performance or an injunction, especially in the face of constructive or equitable fraud. ° This kind of
naked judicial legislation, simply reversing clear law, is probably
feasible only in an area like remedies. No standards of conduct are
changed, no new relationships are created; it is only the consequences
of an established wrong that are altered. But the alteration is nevertheless fundamental. It turns an action to set aside a contract into an
action for damages for a wrong; unconscionability becomes a kind
of equitable tort." 2
III. CONCLUSION
General conclusions about judicial law reform, in a picture as
varied and complicated as the common law of contracts, are hard to
pin down. I have indicated my views on particular aspects of this
picture as I discussed them. When one looks at them together, I think
that two broad points do emerge.
One is that up to now there has been no revolution at the centre
of the law of contracts, and it is unlikely that there will be. The core
idea of an agreement, a set of terms from which the parties' obligations and rights must be deduced, is still vital. 0 3 It is true that the
way the common law treats the agreement has undergone a marked
99 (1985)

62 B.C.L.R. i.

100 The Chancery Amendment Act, z858 (U.K.), 1858, 21 & 22 Vict.,
received in B.C. as part of English law, i 9 November i858.

c. 27,

:10 Supra,note 99 at 47.
102 Like breach of fiduciary duty, the ground on which Newton, the majority
shareholder, was held liable.
103 Compare the definition Pollock gave in 1876 (supra, note 4 at 2), which
he took from Savigny: "When two or more persons concur in expressing a
common intention so that rights or duties of those persons are thereby determined, this is an agreement."
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evolution. Rather than a form of private legislation that commands
judicial deference, contract is tending to be regarded more and more
as a form of private conduct that needs to be monitored and controlled. In deciding whether to enforce the contract, the courts are
now much readier to look at how the agreement came about, how its
terms are balanced between the parties, and how the parties' legitimate expectations must be seen against the background of their particular experience and circumstances. The remedial side of the judicial role is growing in relation to the enforcement side.
Still, this is at most only half a revolution. Generally it has not
displaced in judicial minds the need to enforce contracts if they are
to be a viable instrument of commercial and social planning. The
law of contract retains its unique double perspective, which combines a retrospective assessment - the fairness of the outcome in the
particular case - with a prospective concern for how the individual
decision will affect the way that future contracts are made and carried out. Contract law always must, and usually does, bear in mind
the calculated risks that parties took when they made their agreement
and performed it, not -

as tort can often do -

concentrate on clear-

ing up the aftermath. The law of contract is basically about telling
people they have to lie in beds they made for themselves. This is on
the whole a less inspiring exercise than what tort usually does- to
shift or distribute a victim's losses and deter antisocial conduct; but
the law cannot do without both.
The other point, little more than common sense, is the absolutely
crucial role of the concepts in which we frame the law. Academics,
including I think those whose ideas are reflected in the Ontario Law
Reform Commission's Report, are sometimes too aware of how traditional legal concepts can often be our masters rather than our
servants. Doctrines like consideration and privity have stood in the
way of desirable advances in the law because they are strong ideas
that resist any modification. On the other hand, the malleability of
concepts like the objective meaning of a contract and the unconscionable use of superior bargaining power have made reform possible
and to some extent pointed its direction.
I think that perhaps academics, more than judges or lawyers let
their impatience with the constrictions of principle, of conceptual
thinking, lead them too far in the other direction, of underestimating how important an adequate conceptual framework is to the law.
Some of the Ontario Law Reform Commission's proposals are based
on the premise that judges should be able to proceed directly from
considerations of policy to the ultimate decision without the mediation
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of articulated general principles. The Commission's proposal on
unconscionability is a good example. Judges must make sure they
canvass a variety of quite disparate factual elements, including as a
minimum the twelve factors on the list, and after that can do whatever they think is right. It would be very difficult for judges to give
themselves such an untrammelled jurisdiction. They would have to
explain how the facts in the case before them raised a particular
problem, and they would have to frame a rule, albeit in general
terms, direct at that problem. It is very difficult-although now and
then it is possible-for a judge to say simply, "these are the facts; the
law is that I can do whatever I think right under these circumstances
that the plaintiff (or defendant) should win."
The constant struggle to translate what we want to do into concepts, into rules, is indispensable to the common law. It is something
that legislation can give up on; the legislature, unlike the judges
themselves, can just say, "you judges can do whatever you think is
right in the circumstances." Sometimes that is the only practical way
to proceed. But if too many problems are addressed in this way, we
run the risk of turning judicial decisions into little more than instinctual responses labelled with the name of a discretion.
It is the interplay between judicial instinct and formulated principle, each working on the other, that gives vitality and coherence
not just to the common law, but to all law. That is why judicial law
reform in contract, for all its failings and shortcomings, can show us
many strengths as well.

